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Storage Technology
and the Environment
Erik Lichtenberg and David Zilberman
A dynamic framework is presented for analyzing regulations affecting the use of
spoilage-reducing inputs with potential negative environmental effects, such as pes-
ticides, growth regulators, chemical preservatives, and irradiation. Such regulations
change intertemporal consumption patterns as well as total output. Consumers may
benefit from restrictions on storage technology, giving them a reason to support regu-
lation even when it may not be warranted to correct environmental externalities.
Static analyses do not take into account changes in intertemporal consumption, and
thus may give misleading depictions of the effects of imposing new regulations.
Implications of the framework for development and trade policy are discussed, as are
extensions to cases of uncertainty and multiple time periods.
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Introduction
Because of its role in stabilizing price and consumption, commodity storage has received
a great deal of attention in the economics literature (for comprehensive treatments see
Newbery and Stiglitz; Gardner; and Williams and Wright). Economists have focused on
the desirability of public storage and the design of public inventory holding strategies.
As pointed out by Wright and Williams (1982), commodity storage is a productive activity
that transfers a commodity from one period to the next. Just how productive this activity
is depends on the technology brought to bear.
The perishability of  commodities is affected by factors like temperature, humidity, and
the presence of disease or insect pests, and can be controlled by applying inputs such as
temperature control (refrigeration), drying, aeration, irradiation, and pesticides. For
example, fruits, vegetables,  and grains are commonly treated with chemical pesticides
after harvest to reduce spoilage losses and enhance food safety. Corn is dried to lengthen
storage life and reduce spoilage  losses.  A major motivation  for the use  of the growth
regulator daminozide (Alar) on apples was to lengthen the storage life by reducing
harvest-time  maturity. A large proportion of the chemical additives used in processed
foods are preservatives.
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To date, economists have paid little attention to the technological choices involved in
storage and,  in particular,  to their economic implications.  Economists have assumed
either that stored commodities  are perfectly nonperishable or that they are subject to
spoilage at a constant rate which cannot be altered. The operations research literature
similarly assumes  exogenous  spoilage; this literature concentrates  on the impacts  of
spoilage on the choice of how much inventory to hold (see, e.g.,  Nahmias; Zipkin). Yet,
measures taken to reduce spoilage losses have increasingly been bones of contention in
public policy.
Some of the biggest controversies  over pesticides during the past few years have
involved chemicals with important uses in prolonging  storage life. For instance, fruits
and vegetables are commonly subjected to post-harvest treatment with fungicides,
which may be carcinogenic. Methyl bromide is used to treat a wide variety of fruits and
nuts, particularly for export. However, its use is being phased out worldwide due to its
activity as a depleter of stratospheric ozone. A televised report on the potential carcino-
genicity of the growth regulator Alar caused a sharp reduction in apple consumption.
Chemical preservatives are the subject of long-standing debates concerning food safety
(e.g., the use of nitrite to preserve meats), as is the use of irradiation to preserve foods.
The use of refrigeration requires  electricity and is thus indirectly involved in environ-
mental problems ranging from air pollution  and global warming caused by fossil fuel-
fired power plants to fishery, wildlife, and scenic damage attributable to hydroelectric
power generation.
In this study, a framework is presented for analyzing storage technology choices and
their impacts on resource allocation, on prices, on the environment, and on the economic
welfare of consumers and producers. The analysis applies to a class of inputs which can
be characterized  as storage enhancing or spoilage reducing.  This class includes inputs
such as refrigeration, drying, pesticides, irradiation, and vacuum packing. In contrast to
much of the literature on storage, we concentrate on short-term storage where commodi-
ties are stored across seasons within a year. In this context,  storage is used to smooth
differences in consumption between the time of production, which takes place over a short
period (e.g., harvest), and time of consumption, which continues throughout the year.
Our analysis thus applies to inventory management of commodities which are rela-
tively highly perishable-i.e., fruits and vegetables, poultry, fish, and meats. A simple
two-period model is utilized in which production and environmental damage occur in one
period (summer), while consumption occurs in both periods (summer, winter). The social-
ly optimal level of spoilage-reducing input use is derived, and the effects of alternative
policies for addressing environmental damage on supply, market equilibrium, and con-
sumer and producer incomes are examined.
Because storage technology choices affect the distribution of consumption over time,
the market-level welfare effects of policies affecting storage technology must be evaluated
using an intertemporal  model. In such a context, it becomes possible for consumers  to
gain from restrictions on storage technology-unlike  in the static case. The intertem-
poral evolution of price will depend on storage technology choices, and consequently on
public policies affecting spoilage-reducing inputs. The model also indicates that derived
demands for spoilage-reducing  inputs should include intertemporal variables such as
interest rates; further, it can be used to specify demand functions for this class of inputs.
Implications for specific policies, such as those regarding pesticides  or energy pricing,
are also discussed.
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In many countries, improvements  in post-harvest handling (including storage) are
viewed as a low-cost means of increasing food supplies. In the former USSR, for example,
it is widely believed that one-quarter to one-third of agricultural production may be lost
during transport or due to spoilage. In other countries, development of certain export
industries (e.g., winter vegetable production in Mexico and Central America)-and
hence development strategy more broadly-depends critically on refrigerated  storage
and transportation,  energy prices, and agro-chemicals  for post-harvest use. In these
countries, public policy decisions related to development of transportation infrastructure,
electrification,  energy pricing,  and construction  of storage facilities exert  significant
influence on storage technology.
Production and Storage in a Social  Optimum
Consider a simple two-period model of equilibrium in the intertemporal market for a
storable but perishable good  Q, produced during the first period by a price-taking
industry with a convex cost function C(Q). We assume the industry is characterized by
decreasing returns to scale, as is typical of perishable agricultural commodities due to
scarcity of land with good soils, appropriate climate, and sufficient growing-season mois-
ture. Total industry production is QT.  An amount Q1 is consumed in the first period. The
remaining output, Z = QT  - Q1, is placed in storage at a cost, S(Z) (with Sz > 0, Szz  > 0),
to be consumed in the second period. (Derivates are denoted by subscripts.)
The amount of spoilage occurring during storage is H(X, Z), where X is an input (e.g.,
a pesticide) that reduces perishability and is purchased at a price w. We assume spoil-
age exhibits constant returns to scale,  so that H(X, Z) can be written as Z6(x), where
x = X/Z is the amount of the spoilage-reducing input X used per unit of output placed in
storage  (6x  < 0, 6=  > 0). Consumption in the second period is Q2 =  [1  - 8(x)]Z.
Two interpretations of consumption in periods 1 and 2 are possible. First, the stored
commodity available in period 2 is identical to the freshly produced commodity in period
1; that is, the model treats optimal allocation of stored, fresh product over time. This
interpretation  applies to fruits like apples or pears sold from  storage during the off-
season.  A second  possible  interpretation  is that the freshly produced  commodity  is
consumed in period  1, and a processed form is consumed in period 2. Under this inter-
pretation, our model depicts choices involving intertemporal allocation of consumption
between the fresh form of the commodity, consumed at the time of production, and the
processed  form, consumed later. This interpretation  applies to fruits like cherries  or
berries consumed fresh during the harvest season and in processed form (frozen or
canned) during the remainder of the year. For simplicity, we do not address situations
where there is substitution between the fresh and processed forms of the commodity
during either period.
We also assume demand in the two periods to be additively separable,  so that inverse
demand in period i is DZ(Qi) (i =  1,  2).  The  assumption that planned  consumption in
either period is independent of consumption in the other period (e.g., demand for apples
in the winter is independent of apple consumption in the fall) seems reasonable, especi-
ally given strong seasonality of demand for many perishable commodities.
Industry demand for the spoilage-reducing  input is assumed to account for a small
share of total demand for the input (or, equivalently, the input is produced under
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constant returns to scale), so that the industry faces a perfectly elastic supply at a fixed
price w. Finally, use of the spoilage-reducing input is assumed to cause environmental
damage characterized by a convex cost function,  V(X), representing the social value of
environmental and human health damage associated with storage. Damage occurs
either directly, through such pathways as occupational  exposure to pesticides during
treatment, unknowing exposure to pesticide residues on foods, or stratospheric  ozone
depletion caused by use of methyl bromide, or indirectly as a result of increased use of
electric power. Because this damage may occur in either or both periods, V(X) is properly
interpreted as the present value of the costs of environmental damage. Markets for these
aspects  of environmental quality do not typically exist,  so this cost is external to the
industry.
Spoilage-reducing  inputs may also have beneficial environmental  effects, most not-
ably enhancing food safety. For example, irradiation reduces the incidence of illness and
death from microbial contaminants.  Fungicides  can have similar effects by reducing
mold in fresh produce. Fumigants are used to prevent the spread of pests known to cause
substantial economic damage (such as the Mediterranean fruit fly). These benefits are
not modeled explicitly.  Those not taken into account in market transactions are equiva-
lent to reductions in environmental damage. Situations where these positive externalities
dominate can be analyzed using the model by reinterpreting V(X) as an addition to social
welfare rather than a subtraction from it [in which case V(X) would need to be concave].
Situations where the beneficial  effects are taken into account in market transactions
may be captured in the model to some extent by the difference between period 2 demand
and period  1 demand. A more complete treatment would require explicitly modeling
period 2 demand  as a function of spoilage-reducing input use.
The social optimum is given by the solution to the problem of choosing Q 1, QT,  and x
to maximize the present value of consumer welfare less costs of production, storage, and
environmental  damage, plus expenditures  on the spoilage-reducing  input:
(1)  max W= fQ'Dl(q)dq +  1  fQ2D2(q)dq - C(QT)
(1  +r)
- S(Z)  - wZx  - V(Zx),
where r is the periodic discount rate. If consumption is positive in both periods, the social
optimum is given by
(2a)  DI(Q1) - HD
2(Q  )[1 - 5(xe)]e (12 +  r)>  +SZ(Ze)  , +eV(Xeze
(1  +r)
D2(Qe)[1  - 6(xe)] (2b)  D  2 )  )1  - r)-  C,(Qe) - Sz(Ze)  - wxe  - xeVx(xZ) 
= O,
and
(2c)  -6()  wZe  - ZeVx(xeZe)  =  0,
(1  +r)
where superscripts denote equilibrium values. These conditions are sufficient (and thus
a market equilibrium with environmental costs internalized is stable) whenever demand
in both periods is downward sloping and marginal production, storage, and environ-
mental costs are increasing.
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Equation (2a) is the familiar arbitrage condition requiring that there can be no mar-
ginal gain from transferring a unit for sale from one period to another. Foregoing sale
of a unit of output in period 1 to sell it in period 2, for example, entails a loss equal to
the period 1 equilibrium price p[ = D (Q[). The gain from selling in period 2 equals the
present value of the period 2 price pl2(l +  r), multiplied by (1-  6) to adjust for storage
losses, less three components of cost: (a) marginal storage cost Sz, (b) expenditure on the
spoilage-reducing input per unit stored Wux,  and (c) the marginal environmental cost of
storing an additional unit xVx. The spoilage rate 6 appears technically equivalent to the
interest rate r in this equation, in that an increase in 6 makes period 2 production rela-
tively less remunerative  and therefore  serves to shift production forward in time.  In
contrast to the previous literature, though, the spoilage rate is endogenous and can be
adjusted by using more or less of the spoilage-reducing input x.
Alternatively, equation (2a) can be interpreted in terms of the intertemporal dynamics
of the price of the commodity. Rewriting equation (2a) yields the condition that the spot
price of the commodity  in period  2,  D2(Q), must  equal the  sum of the price  of the
commodity in period  1, D
1(Qx), the direct marginal costs of storage, Sz(Z) + wx, and the
marginal environmental costs of storage, xVx(xZ),  adjusted for time (divided by 1  + r)
and for spoilage losses (multiplied by 1- 6). Thus, the spot price of the commodity must
rise at a rate greater than the rate of interest because of the costs of storage and because
of spoilage losses.
Equation (2b) is essentially the familiar condition stating price must equal marginal
cost. In this case, the firm equates the effective real price of a unit sold in period 2,
which is the present value of the period 2 price adjusted as before for spoilage  losses,
with the sum of the marginal costs of production,  storage, and environmental  damage.
Again, spoilage is endogenous, and thus the real discount factor, (1- 6)/(+  r), is a func-
tion of the spoilage-reducing input.
Equation (2c)  states the spoilage-reducing input (per unit of stored commodity) x
should be used at a level that equates the value of its marginal product [which equals
the present value of the price of a unit of the commodity in period 2, D
2(Q2)/(1 + r), times
the marginal  product of the spoilage-reducing  input, Z6J],  with its cost wZ plus the
marginal cost of damage ZeVx.
Combining equations (2a) and (2b) gives
P  = CQ(Qe),
which states the price of the commodity in period 1 equals the marginal cost of producing
total output. The period 1 price will not depend directly on costs associated with storage,
including environmental damage associated with the use of the spoilage-reducing input;
instead, it will be influenced by storage costs only indirectly, via changes in total output.
The price of the commodity in period 2 exceeds the period 1 price, as shown by rewrit-
ing equation (2a):
pe  e=pl  Z_+r_  i  S=  Ze)+WX 
e +XeVXeZ) P2  P 1i  r-6  +  1 + r  S  IX  eZ  e)]
Pe  1-6  1-6  e  P1
The rate of capital gains from storing an additional dollar's worth of the commodity
should equal the rate of interest adjusted for spoilage losses, (r - 6)/(1 - 6), plus the full
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social marginal cost, (Sz + wx +  xVx)lp1, discounted forward one period and adjusted for
spoilage losses. Therefore, the intertemporal evolution of  the price of the commodity will
depend on spoilage losses, spoilage-reducing input use, marginal storage cost, and the
environmental cost of storage.
Internalizing Environmental Costs
Equations (2a)-(2c) represent the first-best outcome. But in most cases, environmental
damage from the use of spoilage-reducing inputs will be external to both producers and
consumers  of the stored commodity, so the marginal cost of environmental damage  is
typically not taken into account in a free-market equilibrium. The conditions describing
this equilibrium will be equations (2a)-(2c), with Vx = 0.
Government intervention  is needed to attain the first-best solution.  Obvious policy
instruments include a Pigouvian tax imposed on the spoilage-reducing  input equal to
Vx(xeZe). Market mechanisms can be used to achieve the same effect, e.g., by implement-
ing a system of tradable permits for the spoilage-reducing input-in which case total
permits would equal xeZe,  and the equilibrium price of a permit would equal Vx(xeZe).
Alternatively, regulators may use direct controls, such as restricting spoilage-reducing
input use per unit of stored commodity to the socially optimal level xe.  Any of these
instruments will lead to the first-best allocation in the industry.
Regulators may also impose policies that are not first-best.  For example,  they may
impose direct controls on use of the spoilage-reducing input per unit of stored commodity
at a stricter-than-privately-optimal  level (say, t < xe).  In this case, resource  allocation
in this industry will be determined by the constraint x <  t. Other restrictions on input
use can be modeled as exogenous shifts in spoilage. This may be the case in regulations
affecting the way the spoilage-reducing input is applied. For example, reentry regulation
or other regulations affect the timing of pesticide application and therefore may influ-
ence spoilage.
In order to assess the impacts  of regulation on the market for stored products, it is
useful to distinguish three generic types:  (a) changes in price of the spoilage-reducing
input, (b) exogenous absolute changes in the spoilage rate, and (c) limitations on the use
of the spoilage-reducing  input. Most policies can be modeled as combinations  of one or
more of these types.
An increase in the price of the spoilage-reducing input comes from imposition of a cor-
rective tax or may implicitly capture the effects of other policy actions. To illustrate, if
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) cancels the registration of a pesticide used
to prolong storage life, producers may switch to a higher-priced alternative. Changes in
the operation of multipurpose water projects in order to protect wildlife, restore fish-
eries, or improve water quality may result in a higher price of electricity which in turn
affects energy-intensive  storage technologies like refrigeration  or drying of grain.
Imposition of air pollution-control  requirements or tradable emissions permit systems
on coal-fired electric power generators may have similar effects. 1 The effects of such
1Changes in the price of the spoilage-reducing input may also reflect a wide range of other kinds of policies. In many less
developed countries, governments routinely subsidize pesticides to encourage more intensive farming methods. Regulatory
approval of a new storage technology (irradiation, vacuum storage, or a new pesticide) may permit the introduction of cheaper
spoilage-reducing inputs. Subsidization or taxation of energy sources will also influence the use of these technologies.
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policies can be modeled as increases in the unit cost of the spoilage-reducing input from
its unregulated  equilibrium value of w.
Exogenous shifts in spoilage may result from policy actions such as restrictions on the
use of pesticides or food additives. For example, pesticides developed to reduce spoilage
by killing fungi, bacteria, or insects can only be used after approval from the EPA. The
EPA may cancel the registration of currently used pesticides, resulting in greater spoilage
and/or a shift to less effective pesticides. Food and Drug Administration  (FDA) restric-
tions on food additives may have similar results.2
We model such exogenous change in spoilage by letting the spoilage rate be a function
ofx and a shifter a, 6(x, a), such that 6,  > 0. Following the arguments of Lichtenberg and
Zilberman, increased spoilage is assumed to result in nondecreased marginal productivity
of the spoilage-reducing input, i.e., 6xa < 0. The regularity condition  6x6  - 6 6  2 O  is also
assumed to hold. This condition ensures that an increase in the use of the spoilage-
reducing input x decreases 6x more than it  increases 6,; loosely, the direct effect of a
change in x on its own marginal product is greater than its indirect effect on 6,.  Note,
this conditions holds with equality if spoilage is exponential  (6(x, a)  = ea  -P)  or logistic
(6(x, a) = 1/ [1  +  e  -x]).
Limitations on the use of the spoilage-reducing input (per unit of storage) reflect
direct controls of the kind most commonly used in the United States. For example, the
EPA typically imposes maximum allowable application rates for pesticides or irradiation
in response  to concern  about  adverse  effects  on human health  or the environment.3
Pesticide residue tolerances on foods are another example of this type of policy.4
We model the imposition of such a limit on spoilage-reducing input use as a constraint
x <  t, where t is the maximum allowable usage rate. Let the shadow price of this constraint
be X. If the constraint is binding, then xe =  t, and  Xe  = [6x(t, a)p/(l + r) - w]Ze > 0.
To begin, assume the constraint on use of the spoilage-reducing input t is nonbinding,
and the market ignores the marginal cost of environmental damage, i.e., Vx = O. Totally
differentiating the excess demand system (2a)-(2c) yields:
2  Exogenous changes  in spoilage may also  be due to natural factors  such as differences in perishability (for example,
peaches would be characterized by  a higher spoilage rate than apples),  the emergence  of a new disease, or differences in
location (crops grown in hotter, more humid climates tend to have higher spoilage rates). Policy interventions may result in
lower spoilage  rates.  Regulatory approval  of a new spoilage reduction  method such as  irradiation would be an  example.
Reductions  in effective  transportation costs  and  elimination of trade barriers  can also  be viewed as  exogenous  absolute
decreases in the spoilage rate.
3Limitations  on spoilage-reducing input use may also arise from other sources. The availability of electricity in many areas
is determined by public investment, while in other areas, electricity may be rationed, effectively limiting its use in storage
facilities.  Limited capacity of storage or transportation facilities may constrain the use of spoilage-reducing  inputs. In less
developed countries, farmers' use of purchased inputs like pesticides is often restricted by credit availability, which in turn
is influenced by government lending policies.
4 Under the terms of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics  Act, the EPA also regulates the maximum allowable  concentration
of pesticide residues found on foods, called a residue tolerance.  Fresh produce with residue levels in excess of the tolerance
cannot be sold legally, and shipments will be confiscated if they are discovered during FDA inspection. If the application rate
or the half-life  of the pesticide is high enough,  a residue tolerance can set a binding constraint on the amount of pesticide
used. Foster and Babcock present an empirical study involving tobacco exports where this phenomenon  occurred.
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Solving the system of equations  (3) gives the following set of results.
*  PROPOSITION  1. Imposition of a tax on the spoilage-reducing  input will decrease
spoilage-reducing  input use per unit of  stored  commodity (Ox/Ow < 0), total spoilage-
reducing input use (OX/Ow  < 0), and period  2 consumption (Q 2/QOw  < 0), and will
increase the period 2 price of the commodity (Op 2/Ow > 0). Total output (OQT/Ow),
period 1  consumption (OQ 1/dw), and storage (aZ/lw) may  increase or decrease;
period  1 consumption rises (falls) only when total output and storage  fall (rise).  An
increase in total output and storage and a decrease in period 1 consumption are
more likely with (a)  inelastic  period  2 demand, (b) an inelastic  marginal  product of
the spoilage-reducing  input, and  (c) a larger  gap between the marginal  and average
products  of the spoilage-reducing  input.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. Imposing a tax on the spoilage-
reducing input makes it more expensive, and consequently makes transferring consump-
tion from period 1 to period 2 more costly. Spoilage-reducing input use per unit of storage
and period 2 consumption both fall, and the period 2 price of the commodity rises. The
increase in the period 2 price in turn increases the return to selling in period 2, and thus
the attractiveness of storage, counteracting the increased marginal cost of transferring
consumption to period  2.
The net effect on period 1 consumption, total output, and storage in equilibrium
therefore  depends on the relative sizes of these cost and price effects. If the price effect
is large  relative to the cost  effect,  the return to selling in period 2 will rise. Greater
storage will substitute for lower spoilage-reducing input use as a means for transferring
consumption from  period  1 to period  2. As a consequence,  output will rise and some
consumption will be transferred from  period  1 to period 2 in order to compensate for
larger spoilage losses. However, the reduction in spoilage-reducing input use will exceed
the increase in storage, and so total spoilage-reducing  input use will fall.  If the price
effect is small relative to the cost effect, the opposite will occur. In this case, total output
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spoilage losses permit increased period 1 consumption even though total output decreases.
Total spoilage-reducing input use will fall because both storage and spoilage-reducing
input use per unit of storage will fall.
Highly elastic period 2 demand implies a small price effect. A large gap between the
marginal and average productivity  and a low elasticity of marginal productivity of the
spoilage-reducing input imply less rapidly declining marginal productivity, and thus a
smaller cost effect.5
Imposing a Pigouvian tax, dw = Vx(xeZ),  on the spoilage-reducing  input will induce
the market to replicate the social optimum. Based on Proposition 1, in a market where
damage from use of spoilage-reducing inputs remains external, period 2 consumption,
spoilage-reducing input use per unit of storage, and total spoilage-reducing  input use
are higher than socially optimal. One cannot tell unambiguously whether period 1 con-
sumption, total output, and storage are higher or lower than socially optimal. Period 1
consumption is likely to be too high, and total output and storage too low, whenever the
price effect is greater and/or the cost effect is smaller.
*  PROPOSITION 2. An exogenous increase  in spoilage  will decrease  total output (sQT/Dra
< 0), storage (aZ/da < O), total spoilage-reducing  input use (aXla < 0), and  period
2 consumption (aQ 21/a < O0),  and will increase  period 1 consumption (aOQ 1/a  > 0)
and spoilage-reducing  input use per unit of storage (bx/da  > 0). The period  2 price
will increase (aP 2/aa  > 0), while the period 1 price will fall (ap 1/ea  < 0).
An exogenous increase in the spoilage rate always leads to lower returns to selling in
period 2, and therefore lower period 2 consumption, storage, and total output, as well
as greater period  1  consumption.  In contrast  to the previous  case,  though, greater
exogenous spoilage leads to more intensive use of the spoilage-reducing  input, even if
the marginal product of the spoilage-reducing  input is unaffected  (6o  = 0). This occurs
because the reduction in period 2 consumption means a higher period 2 price, and thus
a higher value of marginal product for the spoilage-reducing input, while the price of the
spoilage-reducing  input w remains unchanged. However, the decrease in storage will
always exceed the increase in spoilage-reducing  input use per unit of storage, and so
total spoilage-reducing  input use will fall.
Proposition 2 further implies that producers of storable but highly perishable commod-
ities are likely to make more intensive use of spoilage-reducing  inputs like pesticides,
other chemical additives, or refrigeration than producers of  less perishable commodities.
For example, fungicide use per unit of output should be heavier on peaches than apples.
Also, spoilage-reducing inputs will be used more intensively in areas having higher spoil-
age rates because of climatic and other exogenous conditions. Accordingly, firms located
in warm, humid areas will tend to use more spoilage-reducing inputs per unit of output
than those in cooler, drier areas. Therefore, pesticide regulation may alter the regional
distribution of crop production.  For example,  stricter pesticide residue tolerances on
foods would probably have a greater effect on Mexico and Central America than on the
United States.
5 Proposition 1 has additional implications for development policy. Consider the likely effect of policies (e.g., trade liberal-
ization or subsidies) that lower prices for pesticides in developing countries. Lower prices for post-harvest pesticides will make
storage more  attractive,  and thus  shift  consumption  from harvest-time  to later  periods.  This may result in  improved
nutritional status by making fruits and vegetables available over a longer time period. Development of new energy sources
will have similar effects by making refrigeration less expensive  or lowering drying costs.
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The impact of imposing a limit on the maximum allowable use of the spoilage-reducing
input per unit of storage is found by differentiating the excess demand equations for con-
sumption in periods 1 and 2 with xe equated to t and xe inserted. We obtain the following
result.
*  PROPOSITION 3. Decreasing  the maximum allowable  use of the spoilage-reducing  in-
put will decrease total output (aQTI/t < 0), storage (aZ/It  < 0), period  2 consumption
(aQ2alt < 0), and spoilage-reducing  input use per unit of storage (ax/at < 0) and in
total (AX/at < 0), and will increase  period 1 consumption (aQ1/It  > 0). The period  2
price will rise (Op2 /lt  > 0), while the period 1 price will fall (Ap1 ,lt  < 0).
A decrease in the maximum allowable use of the spoilage-reducing  input per unit
stored, t, when it constitutes a binding constraint on x, increases spoilage and thus
lowers the return to selling in period 2. In contrast to the case of exogenous increases
in absolute  spoilage, use of the spoilage-reducing  input per unit of storage must fall.
Total spoilage-reducing input use falls because both storage and spoilage-reducing input
use per unit of storage fall. Consequently, lower tolerances for pesticide residues on foods
should lead to greater harvest-time consumption and reduced pesticide use, storage, and
consumption both in later periods and in total.6
According to Propositions  1-3, alternative approaches  for addressing externalities
associated with storage  technologies  can have  notably different  effects  on the inter-
temporal allocation of consumption.  We have considered three generic instruments,  a
first-best tax on the spoilage-reducing input and two quantity controls: (a) limits on the
intensity of use  of a spoilage-reducing  input, corresponding to a residue tolerance or
constraint on a pesticide application rate, and (b) absolute increases in spoilage rates,
which correspond  to actions like banning the use of specific spoilage-reducing  inputs
(e.g., pesticides,  food additives, or irradiation).
All three  instruments lead to lower period 2  consumption and reductions  in total
spoilage-reducing input use.  Both quantity instruments and the tax on storage induce
unambiguous shifts in the intertemporal distribution of consumption, resulting in lower
storage and total output plus higher period 1 consumption. Unlike limits on spoilage-
reducing input use per unit of storage,  however, an increase in absolute  spoilage
increases the intensity of spoilage-reducing  input use. An optimal tax on the spoilage-
reducing input, by contrast, may induce increases in total output and storage and reduc-
tions in period  1 consumption.
Distributional Effects  of
Policies  Affecting  Storage Technology
The effects of policies affecting storage technology on social welfare are examined in this
section. Overall,  social welfare  can be decomposed  into four categories:  (a) consumer
surplus accruing from consumption (i.e., consumer income exclusive of possible benefits
to consumers from the transfer of tax revenues or from enhanced food safety);  (b) pro-
ducer surplus; (c) tax revenues; and (d) external environmental costs. Imposition of
policies affecting storage technology may affect all four. We focus here on the ways such
6 In contrast, greater credit availability may relax constraints in the use of spoilage-reducing  inputs in many countries,
leading to increased storage and later-period consumption and, likely, improved diets.
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Figure 1.  Impact of eliminating storage on consumer
welfare with costless  production and storage
policies affect consumer and producer surpluses, because these effects may be counter-
intuitive. External environmental  costs are a monotonic function of spoilage-reducing
input use; hence,  the effects of policies  affecting storage technology on these costs can
be derived straightforwardly  from Propositions  1-3.
Both the price and quantity instruments commonly used to address externalities asso-
ciated with storage alter the intertemporal  distribution of consumption.  They always
shift consumption  away from  stored period  2 commodities,  and frequently  increase
consumption of freshly harvested period 1 commodities.  Such a shift makes it possible
for imposition of these policy instruments to make consumers better off strictly in terms
of income from the consumption of the commodity, i.e., ignoring benefits from reductions
in external damage. This result differs markedly from the static case, in which regulatory
measures of these kinds always force consumers to bear at least part of the cost of cor-
recting the externality.
To see why this is so, consider first the simplest possible case. Suppose that r = 6 = 0,
storage  is costless, total supply is perfectly inelastic, and demand is identical in both
periods.  In this case, half of total output will be consumed in each period, as shown in
figure  1.  Consumer welfare  (which equals total welfare in this case) equals twice the
area  represented by ABE.  Now assume  a change  in regulatory policy-for  example,
removal  of a pesticide from the market-results  in the elimination of storage. Total
output QT will be entirely consumed in period 1, and thus consumer welfare will equal
the areaACD. Because demand is downward sloping, the areaABE will be less than the
area EBCD, and eliminating storage will therefore increase consumer welfare.
When r and 6 are nonzero, equilibrium in the market requires that Q2be less than Q1.
The higher are r and 6, the greater this difference becomes. As Q2 shifts farther to
the left of Q1, it becomes more and more likely that consumers' gain in period  1 from
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Figure 2. Impact of an exogenous  increase in  spoilage
on consumer welfare with positive production and
storage costs
eliminating storage will outweigh their loss in period 2; i.e.,  consumers might actually
gain from policies aimed at correcting externalities associated with storage technology.
Now suppose that storage is not costless. To simplify the graphical exposition, assume
demand is the same in both periods, D1(Q) = D2(Q) = D(Q). Let
ND(Q  (QW?2)  I'  - X)]  Q2  wx
ND(Q 2)  =  D  [  - _x)  - - wx (1 + r)  ( 1 - (x)
denote period 2 demand (in present value terms) net of the marginal cost of storage Sz
and expenditure  on the spoilage-reducing  input wx associated with storing a unit of
output. Total demand over the two periods can be depicted by summing period 1 demand
D(Q 1) and ND(Q2) horizontally, as illustrated in figure 2. Equilibrium total output QT
and the period  1 price p1 occur at the intersection  of this total demand curve with the
marginal cost-of-production  curve CQ. Period  1 consumption occurs at the intersection
of the D curve with the p1 line. Period 2 consumption  occurs at the intersection of the
ND curve with the p,  line.  The period  2 price  equals willingness  to pay at period  2
consumption, as observed from the D(Q) demand curve.
An exogenous  increase in spoilage  6  shifts the ND curve  downward to NDr. The D
curve remains unchanged, but the total demand curve shifts downward as shown. Total
output, the period 1 price, and period 2 consumption decrease to Qr, p',  and Q2, respec-
tively. Period  1 consumption increases  to Qf, and the period 2 price increases  to p  .
Consumer surplus in period 2 decreases by an amount equal to the area of the trapezoid
Lichtenberg and Zilberman
OuaIsntitvlJournal  ofAgricultural and  Resource Economics
p2abp 2. At the same time, consumer surplus in period  1 increases by an amount equal
to the area of the trapezoid plfgp[. If the increase in period 1 consumer surplus exceeds
the reduction in period 2 consumer surplus, consumers will gain from policies that lower
spoilage-reducing input productivity.
The conditions under which this phenomenon occurs can be derived by examining the
impacts of regulation on consumer surplus,
e  e
fQe  1  Qe  Pe  e  P2  2 CS = f  Dl(q) dq  +  r1  Q D2(q)dq - pee  P2 Q
and producer  surplus,
ePe
e  e  P2  2  eQ  2  S(Ze)V  e PS  =plQl +  ____  - C(QT)  - S(Ze) - wZexe
(1 +r)
where the price of  the spoilage-reducing input initially equals its unregulated equilibrium
value. Differentiating these expressions using the envelope theorem yields Propositions
4 and 5, below.
*  PROPOSITION 4.  An optimal tax on the spoilage-reducing  input, an exogenous increase
in absolute spoilage, or a decrease in the maximum allowable use of the spoilage-
reducing input  per unit of storage  will increase  consumer welfare if
P2  A(Q2
E2  (1 + r)J  a  )
E1  · (pl{l)
where i = ({,  a, -t}, and el, E 2 < 0 are the respective elasticities  of demand in periods
1 and 2.
*  PROPOSITION  5. A tax on the spoilage-reducing  input, an increase in absolute spoil-
age, or  a decrease in the maximum allowable use of the spoilage-reducing  input will
increaseproducer  welfare if increased  revenue outweighs the increased  cost ofperiod
2 consumption. Thus, a decrease in consumer welfare is a necessary, but not suffi-
cient, condition  for an increase in producer welfare.
To prove Proposition 4, differentiate  consumer surplus using the envelope  theorem
to obtain:
4C S - -Q - }  - (l  r)  - a  e) aCS  e  (  d  (i  Qp  )"V  i
=  ___  _  F  .1
[e j at  (1  +  r)) 2 )  a) naiv\e  (1 + r)earin  y  iael
The first term on the right-hand  side of this expression is positive, while the second is
negative. Rearranging  yields:
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(5)  aCS  _  p )iQ|  e2  +  (1+r))  a
^  12  I  |  e  p  Q( l
where the sign of the change in consumer surplus equals the sign of the term in square
brackets.
To prove Proposition 5, differentiate producer surplus with respect to a to obtain:
(6)  -PS  Qe(P  - +  Q2 pj  _ P2  a
aa  9a)a  (l  +  r)  \[a)  (1  +r)
Differentiating producer surplus with respect to the maximum allowable use of the
spoilage-reducing input t gives:
PS=1  Pl+  Qe  )tp  e  p  _  2Ix(l-) z e . (7)  Qe  Idpdt1  '{  ,+  2  2r))  Ot)  p2S6(1  - r  )  - wZe'
At  at  (1 +r)  t  (1 +r)
Differentiating producer surplus with respect to the tax on the spoilage-reducing input
gives:
(8)  PS  Q1! apf  + (  Q  i  (  1  p2 X  _  eze
9t  CD  l [-  ~  (1  +r)[  ac)
The first two terms in each of these expressions represent the change in revenue,  and
the remaining term(s) the change in the cost of period 2 consumption, as discussed more
fully below.
Proposition 4 states that imposition of a tax on the spoilage-reducing input use (when
it leads to an increase in period 1 consumption),  an exogenous increase  in spoilage, or
a reduction in the maximum allowable  use  of the spoilage-reducing  input leads to a
lower period 1 price and a higher period 2 price, indicating consumers may actually gain
from an increase in spoilage.7 It  can be seen from the proof of the proposition that
consumer welfare will increase when the ratio of the elasticity of period 2 demand
relative to period  1 demand exceeds the ratio of the increase in period 2 expenditure
relative to period 1 expenditure.  This finding suggests consumer welfare is more likely
to increase when period 1 demand is highly inelastic and/or period 2 demand is highly
elastic-an  intuitive result,  because highly elastic  period 2  demand  implies  a small
welfare loss from reduced period 2 consumption, and highly inelastic period 1 demand
implies a large welfare gain from increased period  1 consumption.
Further insight into the conditions under which consumers gain or lose from these
three types of policy measures can be obtained by rewriting the changes in consumer
welfare as:
acs  _  P1 P2(1 -)  1  aQl  (PZ  X
at  e1 (l+r)e2  eL  1 1 (,  at  (1  +  r)e2)  [t at
7 This result is analogous to those obtained by Wright and Williams  (1984) in their analysis of the welfare  effects of the
introduction of storage.  Specifically, the unanticipated introduction of storage can be modeled as an unexpected reduction
in the spoilage rate from 100% to less than 100%.
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aC  l  (1+ r)p 2 [  J)  6a  (1+ r))  i  _  aai)
()  a  =  --  -E  (1  +e  e  )  2 a  £  1  - (l  +r)e2  C  a  a  ))
and
(11)sa (11)  aCS  (_pl  _ p(1-r)  [  1  _  ])  aQl  + (P2Zex'J (ZaxJ
aw  V  e1 (1  +r)e 2 - cln  9w  (1  + r)e2)  t d)
where r = CQQQTICQ is the elasticity of total supply, and o  = Q1/QT is the share of period
1 consumption in total consumption. The first term on the right-hand side of expressions
(9)-(11) is the intertemporal reallocation effect of shifting consumption from period 2 to
period 1. The second term is the damage effect, the impacts of increased spoilage, and
changes in spoilage-reducing  input use on consumer welfare. We generally expect the
damage effect to be negative, so that any of these three regulatory measures will increase
consumers' commodity market income only when the intertemporal reallocation effect
is positive. The intertemporal reallocation effect is more likely to be positive when period
1 demand is highly inelastic, period 2 demand is highly elastic, total supply is highly
elastic, and/or period 1 consumption makes up a large share of total consumption.
The change in producer welfare from any of these three policies can be decomposed
into two effects. The first is a revenue effect,
peP)l  (  Qe  ape)
Qaa  (1  + r)  aa
consisting of a transfer of income from consumers to producers. The second is a cost ef-
fect [-xeZ  for an increase in w,  -(p2e  OZe)/(l +  r) for an increase in a, and (p, 6 x(1 - 8)Z e)/
(1  +r) +  wZe for  a  decrease  in t],  reflecting  the fact  that transferring  a unit  of the
commodity from period 1 to period 2 has become more expensive due to higher spoilage.
The net effect of imposing any of these three policies depends on the signs and rela-
tive sizes of these two effects. If consumers gain from an absolute increase in spoilage
or a reduction  in the maximum  allowable  level of spoilage-reducing  input use,  then
producers lose, and lose more than consumers gain. Thus, producers are more likely to
lose when period  1 demand is highly inelastic, period 2 demand is highly elastic, total
supply is highly elastic, and/or period  1 consumption  makes up a large share of total
consumption.
Situations in which the elasticity  of period 2 demand is high while the elasticity  of
period  1  demand  is low  are likely  to be  common.  For example,  if demand  is linear,
demand elasticity will be low when consumption is high and price low,  such  as one
would expect to occur during harvest season (period  1 in our model). In this case, the
elasticity of demand rises as price rises and consumption falls. Consequently, a higher
elasticity of demand would be expected during the off-season (period 2). When such situ-
ations occur, one would expect to find strong grower opposition to regulatory measures
aimed at spoilage-reducing  input use.  The 1989 Alar situation may be a case in point,
because growers  believed their losses to  be  substantial enough  to warrant lawsuits
against the environmental organizations responsible for a precipitous drop in consump-
tion due to a health scare and for the ultimate removal of this chemical from the market.
These results reveal the importance of  recognizing the specific role of spoilage-reducing
inputs-transferring production and consumption across time. For example, a standard
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analysis treating spoilage-reducing  inputs as generic factors of production in a static
production context would predict that an exogenous increase in spoilage would always
lead to lower equilibrium consumption and a higher equilibrium price, and thus reduced
consumer welfare. When intertemporal reallocation of consumption is taken into account,
however, it becomes evident there are conditions under which consumers would prefer
lower productivity in storage. For instance, it is possible consumers would be better off
without food irradiation, even ignoring potential health and safety risks of the tech-
nology.
Similarly, a standard static analysis would find that regulation can serve as a mech-
anism for controlling  supply and making producers better off, and that a decrease in
consumer welfare is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for an increase in producer
welfare. In contrast to the static case, it is not enough that demand be inelastic in order
for producer welfare to increase. Furthermore, a standard static analysis would miss the
critical importance  of the relative elasticities of demand in periods  1 and 2, as well as
producing erroneous quantitative estimates of welfare effects.
Extensions: Uncertainty
and Multiple Production Periods
The results of the preceding sections can be generalized to cases where period 2 demand
is uncertain and where production  occurs in multiple time periods.
Consider first the case of uncertain period 2 demand. Let inverse demand in period
2 be a function of the quantity consumed and a random factor u E [uo, u]1, i.e., D2(Q2, u).
Let f(u) be the probability density of u. If agents in the industry are risk neutral, the
social optimum is found by choosing Q,, QT, and x ex ante to maximize the expected
present value of consumer welfare minus the costs of production, storage, environmental
damage,  and spoilage-reducing  input use:
(12)  maxE(W)=  Q1 Dl(q) dq  +  1  l Q2 D2(q, u)f(u) dqdu
- C(QT)  - S(Z)  - WZx  - V(Zx).
As before, the competitive equilibrium in the absence of regulation is found by choosing
Q1, QT,  and x to maximize the expected present value of consumer welfare minus the
costs of production, storage,  and spoilage-reducing input use.
The necessary conditions characterizing the social optimum are analogous to condi-
tions (2a)-(2c), with the expected period 2 price,
E(p 2 )  =  U1D
2(Q)f(u)du,
U 0
replacing the actual period 2 price. Thus, the discounted expected period 2 price should
equal the period  1 price plus marginal storage cost plus expenditures  on the spoilage-
reducing input plus (in the social optimum) the marginal cost of environmental damage
from use of the spoilage-reducing input use. The actual period 2 price, in contrast, will
clear the market at the realized level of demand. It is readily seen that Propositions 1-5
will hold ex ante.
If consumers are risk averse rather than risk neutral, the value of period 2 con-
sumption is measured by expected utility rather than expected consumer surplus. The
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necessary conditions  characterizing the social optimum and unregulated competitive
equilibrium can be found by amending conditions (2a)-(2c) to incorporate risk aversion
by replacing the expected period 2 price E(p 2 ) with a certainty equivalent of the expected
marginal utility of consumption.
Express this certainty equivalent as a proportional reduction in the expected period
2 price (1-  p)E(p2 ), where the proportional markdown from expected willingness to pay,
p, is increasing in the degree of risk aversion. As should be apparent from examination
of conditions (2a)-(2c), an increase in risk aversion has an effect similar to an exogenous
increase in the spoilage rate. Therefore, the changes in total output, spoilage-reducing
input use, consumption in periods 1 and 2, and period 1 price enumerated in Proposition
2 also hold for increases in risk aversion. As in the case of risk neutrality, the actual
period 2 price will clear the market at the realized level of demand. Furthermore, since
p = 0 corresponds to the case of risk neutrality, the aforementioned results from Prop-
osition 2 can be interpreted as a comparison of risk-averse consumers to risk-neutral
consumers.
It  is similarly  straightforward to show that the analysis  of the preceding sections
holds for the case of multiple production periods. Consider the case where production
occurs in odd-numbered periods (1, 3, ... ) and consumption is possible in even-numbered
periods only via storage of the commodity. Standard arguments for backstop technologies
in exhaustible resource problems suggest it will always be optimal to plan to consume all
of the stored commodity in each even-numbered period, thereby reducing the multiple-
period problem  to a series of two-period problems,  as with the series analyzed in the
preceding sections.
Intuitively, it will be optimal to carry over some of the commodity in storage from,
say, period 2 to period 3 only if the period 3 price exceeds the period 2 price. But under
certainty, the period 3 price will equal the marginal cost of production in period 3, and
so will be less than the period 2 price. Thus, it will be optimal to exhaust the supply of
the commodity in storage in period 2. Even if future production is uncertain, it will be
optimal to carry over some of the commodity in storage from period 2 to period 3 only
if random factors are expected to keep period 3 production sufficiently low such that the
expected period 3 price exceeds the period 2 price. Analysis of such cases is beyond the
scope of this investigation.
Final Remarks
To date, economists have studied storage from the point of view of stabilization policy,
ignoring choices among storage technologies.  These technologies play a critical role in
storage policy, and in public policy debates more generally,  and their role in environ-
mental policy debates has grown markedly in recent years. Spoilage-reducing inputs such
as pesticides, growth regulators,  chemical preservatives, and irradiation have become
controversial because of actual and putative damage they inflict on human health, wild-
life, and ecosystems. The availability and price of electricity (a key input in refrigeration)
are functions of environmental  damage from the construction and operation of hydro-
electric systems and from air pollution due to coal-fired power plants.
In this study, a framework for analyzing regulations affecting storage technology  is
presented. In contrast to most of the literature, we consider a somewhat different form
of storage. Here, the type of storage focuses on managing differences between time of
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production and times of consumption within a year rather than smoothing randomness
in production and demand and stabilizing consumption  and price over several years.
Our findings  show  the storage  technology  choices  affect total output  as  well  as the
temporal distribution of supply, consumption, and prices. Decisions about quantities to
place in storage are linked to decisions about storage technology.  Policies which alter
the effectiveness  of spoilage-reducing  inputs  or raise  their  cost will  unambiguously
reduce social welfare, but may make either consumers or producers worse off.
Most studies assessing the impacts of regulations affecting storable commodities have
ignored the specific role played by spoilage-reducing  inputs in changing the intertem-
poral distribution of production and consumption. Instead, they have employed static
approaches, modeling the effects of absolute increases in spoilage or increases in the cost
(reductions in the marginal effectiveness) of spoilage-reducing inputs as generic
increases in production cost. An example is the 1991 study by Zilberman et al. on the
impacts of broad-scale  pesticide bans on California agriculture.  The findings obtained
here suggest the results of such earlier studies may be quite misleading. In a standard,
static context, for instance, consumers  can never gain from regulation; however, once
the dynamic nature of spoilage-reducing input productivity is recognized, it becomes clear
they can.
The model developed here can also be applied to broader questions involving storage
of perishable commodities. A number of questions arise in the context of development
policy. Reductions  in post-harvest  losses have  significant promise for increasing  food
production in many areas of the world. Investments in storage infrastructure and in
production capacity for key spoilage-reducing inputs (electricity, pesticides) are critical
policy issues relevant to these global areas.
The model presented here does not consider the implications of capacity constraints.
Extending the model to examine optimal investment in such capacity would be of
interest. More generally, as yield increases become more difficult to achieve because of
limitations on genetic capability and because of concerns about pollution from agricul-
tural chemicals, the importance of reducing storage losses will grow. The tradeoffs
involved in such issues can be analyzed by expanding the model to incorporate effects
of storage on nutritional status, and thus public health, food security, and similar items
of interest.
This framework also yields some insights into issues involving international or inter-
regional trade. For example, foreign production can substitute for storage of domestically
produced  commodities  (e.g., winter imports of Southern Hemisphere  fruits and vege-
tables into the United States). Reductions in effective transportation costs and elimin-
ation of trade barriers can be viewed as exogenous absolute decreases  in the spoilage
rate. From this perspective, liberalizing trade in off-season  produce can improve both
the welfare  of produce  consumers and environmental  conditions in the importing
country by substituting imports for pesticides and other spoilage-reducing inputs known
to cause environmental  damage. The model is also quite similar to one involving trade
between  exporting  and  importing  countries  in  cases  where  losses  incurred  during
transportation can be altered by exporters' actions. The results obtained here thus apply
to  cases  involving regulation  of transportation-loss-reducing  technologies  that cause
negative externalities.
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